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STATE OF UTAH 
STANLEY SKIBA, 
Pmintif f and Respondent, 
vs. 
HOMESTEAD MINERALS CORPORA-
OIL CORPORATION, a oorpora-
OIL CORPORATION, A corpora-
tion, 
Defendant and Appelmnt. 
Case No. 
11677 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondent seeks to require Appellant to transfer for 
a sale some 10,000 shares of its common stock which Re-
SPondent acquired in a "private placement" transaction 
under an investment letter. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
The case was heard May 1, 1969, by the Honorable 
Bryant H. Croft, on an Order to Show Cause served on 
Appellant. Briefs were thereafter filed and on May 7, 1969, 
the Court signed its Findings, Conclusions and Decree re-
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quiring Appellant to transfer Respondent's stock and per-
mit sale thereof. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court decree, 
claiming that it would be unlawful under Federal Securi-
ties law to require free transfer of "investment" stock. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 29, 1968, Respondent conveyed to Appel-
lant an interest in certain mining claims in Nevada for 
which Respondent was issued 10,000 shares of Appellant's 
nonassessable common stock under Certificate No. 4982. 
The certificate was not issued until April 16, 1968, but 
was pursuant to the earlier transaction. The certificate 
bears an investment legend stating: 
"Investment stock not subject to transfer until 
the 29th day of March, 1969." 
The stock was issued by Appellant without any securi-
ties registration in accordance with the exemption from 
registration popularly known as the "private placement" 
exemption under the provisions of Section 4(2) of the 
Securities Act of 1933, as amended. (R. 25) 
On July 9, 1968, Respondent Skiba was issued 1,111 
shares of the nonassessable common stock of Appellant 
represented by Certificate No. 6493, again in exchange for 
certain mining interests. That stock was also issued under 
the "private placement" exemption but the certificate bears 
a different form of investment legend stating: 
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"Investment stock not subject to transfer until 
registered under the Securities Act of 1933 or a 
prior opinion of counsel, satisfactory to the issuer, 
that registration is not required under the Act." 
(R. 22 and 24) 
After March 29, 1969, Respondent presented Certifi-
cate No. 4982 for 10,000 shares to the transfer agent of 
Appellant and requested an issue of new certificates for 
10,000 shares of stock without any investment legend. Ap-
pellant refused to effect the requested transfer. (R. 26) 
This action was subsequently brought to compel such trans-
fer free of restriction so that Respondent could sell all or 
part of the 10,000 shares made the subject of this action. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INVESTMENT PERIOD REQUIRED BY LAW 
HAS NOT EXPIRED AND THE PARTIES WOULD 
BE IN VIOLATION OF FEDERAL LAW IN SELL-
ING OR TRANSFERRING UNREGISTERED 
STOCK. 
In approaching the question of what constitutes. a 
sufficient "holding period" to permit lawful sale of in-
vestment stock acquired in a private placement transaction, 
Appellant is admittedly in a rather embarrassing position 
in this particular case. The stock certificate involved in 
this action bears an investment legend indicating: 
"Investment stock not subject to transfer until 
the 29th day of March, 1969." 
Notwithstanding the specified date on the stock certifi-
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cate, Appellant claims that it is not permitted by law to 
effect a transfer of the stock free of the investment re-
striction. The only answer to this incongruity is that the 
investment legend placed on the stock in that particular 
transaction was placed there by former management of 
Appellant without benefit of counsel. Respondent claims, 
of course, that he had a contract with Appellant permitting 
transfer of the investment shares following March 29, 
1969. However logical that argument may appear, how-
ever, it should even more clearly appear from the law 
cited herein that investment stock acquired in a private 
placement transaction cannot be freely transferred upon 
the expiration of any particular holding period unless 
clearance is obtained from the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. The erroneous assumption of law engaged in 
by prior management of Appellant will not constitute a 
ground for evading the law as Respondent is now requesting. 
It is well known to this Court that the purpose of a 
private placement transaction is to issue stock in a transac-
tion not involving members of the public. Presumably, the 
person receiving the stock without a full registration with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission is sufficiently 
knowledgeable to fend for himself in acquiring information 
regarding the issuing corporation. The public at large is 
entitled to the protection of the information required in a 
registration statement and prospectus. Nevertheless, certain 
investment stock can be sold under rules and guidelines that 
are loosely stated in SEC practice. The matter of a "holding 
period" for investment stock, as evidence that the stock was 
taken for investment and not for public distribution, is 
somewhat elusive. The most intelligent discussion of the 
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problems surrounding investment stock are contained in a 
recent document known as "The Wheat Report," constituting 
a detailed study by the SEC staff, chairmaned by Francis 
M. Wheat, one of the SEC commissioners. The report is 
more properly entitled "Disclosure to Investors, a re-
appraisal of federal administrative policies under the '33 
and '34 Acts." The report is widely distributed through 
the auspices of Commerce Clearing House, Inc., and a. copy 
of the complete report is found in the Utah State Law 
Library. Believing this to be a valid source of authority 
establishing current SEC practice and affiliated law, quo-
tations from the report will be most helpful. The Wheat 
study describes the present problem as follows : 
"2. Problems associated with present doctrine 
and their consequences. 
(a) 'How long do I have to hold?' 
The Commission has indicated that 'one eviden-
tiary fact' to be considered in determining whether 
or not a private purchaser took with the necessary 
investment intent is the length of time between acqui-
sition of the securities and resale.18 
Will any particular holding period furnish suffi-
cient evidence of investment intent? No definite 
answer is available. In the language of the Com-
mission's statement, the weight to be given to the 
holding period will vary with the circumstances of 
each case. Of course, the longer the period of reten-
tion, the more persuasive would be the argument 
is securities Act Release No. 3825 
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that the resale is not at variance with original "in-
vestment intent" . . .14 
Other pronouncements on this subject by the 
Commission and its staff furnish little additional 
clarification.15 In its opinion in the Crowell-Collier 
case,16 the Commission observed that ' ... holding 
for one year does not afford a statutory basis for 
an exemption . . .' Subsequent to Crowell-Collier, 
former Chairman (then Commissioner) Cohen re-
marked that a presumption of investment intent 
might arise after a two-year holding, a statement 
which has sometimes been referred to as the 'Cohen 
two-year rule.' Its author clearly indicated, however, 
that certain kinds of factual situations would negate 
any such presumption, despite the period of holding.17 
A very recent comment on the subject by an experi-
enced private practitioner is as follows: 
... As a practical matter, the shares may 
. . . be sold in any manner after the lapse of a 
sufficient amount of time, the period being 
rather indefinite but probably two to three 
years. For the record, however, it is official 
dogma that if stock is acquired for investment, 
a lapse of time (no matter how long) does not 
automatically free the stock from restrictions 
on resale. (Footnote 'omitted) 18 
14Id. 
150mitted 
16Crowell-Collier Publishing Co. Securities Act Release 
No. 3825, p. 7 (August 12, 1957). 
11SEC Problems of Controlling Stockholders and in 
Underwritings, 30-31 (Israels, ed., 1962). 
18Schneider, Acquisitions Under the Federal Securities 
Laws-A Program for Reform, 116 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1323, 
1337 (1968). 
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Members of the Commission's staff have on 
occasion advised investors who hold privately placed 
debt securities that the staff would not look with 
disfavor on a resale after five years." (The Wheat 
Report, 164, 165) 
The stock of Respondent made the subject of this action 
was issued in April 1968 but was effective as of the transac-
tion date, February 29, 1968. In even the most liberal of 
the SEC interpretations cited above, a holding period of at 
least two years must exist as one of the factors the SEC will 
consider in whether or not investment stock may be sold 
to the public without registration. Since Respondent here 
is attempting to sell his stock without restriction (R. 12), 
he may create various civil and criminal liabilities of the 
Securities Act of 1933 unless all of the legal factors exist 
which are required by the SEC. It has been conceded by 
Appellant that the legend placed on Respondent's stock 
under instructions of previous management may have been 
deficient in form. It is here submitted, however, that 
Appellant should not be required to participate in an illegal 
action merely to correct the deficiency in form or to permit 
a public sale of unregistered stock. The courts should refuse 
to enforce a contract where such enforcement would create 
an illegal result. Haddock vs. Salt Lake City (1901) 23 Utah 
521, 65 Pac. 491 and Neil vs. Utah Wholesale Grocery (1922) 
61 Utah 22, 210 Pac. 201. 
Respondent has not satisfactorily rebutted the pre-
sumption that the securities were acquired by him from 
Appellant for investment and that the requested transfer 
may be made without creating a violation of the federal 
registration requirements. It has been repeatedly held that 
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the party seeking to establish that securities have been 
acquired under the provision of an exemption from the 
registration requirements of Section 5 of the Securities Act 
of 1933 (called the "Act" in this brief) rests with the party 
claiming exemption. U. S. vs. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 
376 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1967). (See CCH Federal Securities 
Law Reporter, Volume 1, Paragraph 2850.126 for additional 
citations.) If, as a matter of fact, Respondent acquired 
the securities, with a view to distribution, he would be 
considered an "underwriter" under the provisions of Section 
2 ( 11) of the Act. The issue of securities to Respondent by 
Appellant would constitute a distribution of securities by 
an issuer through an underwriter, which by definition 
could not be done lawfully under the provisions of Section 
4 (2). Any further sale by Respondent as an underwriter 
would certainly be unlawful. 
Respondent alleges in Paragraph 3 of the complaint 
(R. 1) that a sufficient amount of time has elapsed since 
the acquisition of securities in question by him to rebut any 
presumption that such were acquired for investment and 
that, therefore, the certificates may now be transferred 
and the acquired securities disposed of. Such allegation 
does not conform with law, and the lower court's finding 
that Appellant's defenses are "without merit" (R. 26) is 
most untenable. 
In 1957, the Commission issued an additional interpre-
tation of the exemption upon which the Respondent relies, 
which stated in pertinent part as follows : 
"Holding for the six month capital gains period 
of the tax statute, holding in an 'investment account' 
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rather than a 'trading account,' holding for a deferred 
sale, holding for a market rise, holding for sale if 
the market does not rise, or holding for a year does 
not afford a statutory basis for an exemption and, 
therefore, does not provide an adequate basis on 
which counsel may give opinions or businessmen rely 
in selling securities without registration. Purchasing 
for the purpose of future sales is nonetheless pur-
chasing for sale and, if the transaction involves any 
public offering even at some future dat.e, the regis-
tration provisions apply unless at the time of the 
public offering an exemption is available." Securities 
Act Release No. 33-3825. 
Since Respondent has not held the securities involved 
for a period of at least two years prior to an attempted 
disposition thereof, it is respectfully submitted that neither 
the Appellant nor the court can conclude that the presump-
tion that the securities were acquired for distribution has 
been satisfactorily rebutted and, therefore, the requested 
relief should have been denied by the lower court. 
Assuming the stock in question is transferred and sold, 
who would stand to lose? If the exemption cannot be sup-
ported and is not available, Respondent violates Section 5 
of the Act by selling unregistered stock, so that the trans-
action is subject to rescission or Respondent is liable for 
damages. The liability would also attach to the broker who 
is the agent of Respondent and may encompass the broker's 
salesmen, even though they are unaware the stock was not 
exempt. More seriously, from our point of view, there is 
authority to the effect that the liability would attach to 
Appellant as the issuer. See S.E.C. vs. Mono-Kearsarge 
Consolidated Mining Company, 167 F. Supp. 248, (U. S. 
D. C., Utah, 1958). Although that case involves the issuance 
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of an injunction against sales and transfers of unregistered 
stock, and civil liability was not immediately involved, much 
of the Court's language could be used to support civil lia-
bility on the basis that the corporation in fact contemplated 
or acquiesced in a subsequent public redistribution of un-
registered stock. 
POINT II 
THE RECORD DOES NOT SHOW RESPONDENT'S 
"CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES" NECESSARY TO 
CLAIM ANY EXEMPTION FROM REGISTRATION. 
In Paragraph 3 of the complaint, Respondent alleges: 
". . . plaintiff has sustained a change in his 
investment intent which now permit.s him to sell said 
shares of stock ... " (R. 1) 
Such allegation can refer to no factor other than a "change 
in circumstances," which is one of the factors considered 
by the court.s in determining the validity of stock sales 
under an exemption from registration. 
The question then arises, is an immediate sale per-
missible because of a sufficient change in Respondent's 
circumstances as would, in effect, not negate the original 
representation that the acquisition had been for investment 
purposes? It seems that Respondent's complaint is predi-
cated entirely upon this theory. The Wheat Report describes 
the problem as follows: 
"(b) What is a sufficient 'change of circum-
stances?' 
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As noted above, the 'change of circums.tances' 
doctrine resulted from the felt need for an affirma-
tive demonstration of an original investment intent. 
If an investor suffers a 'change of circumstances' 
between his original purchase and his subsequent 
resale, one can argue on the basis of factual evidence 
that resale was not contemplated from the very start. 
But what is a sufficient 'change of circumstances' 
for this purpose? 
This has always been a troublesome question. 
In the first place, a change that could reasonably 
have been anticipated at the time of purchase will 
be of no evidentiary value." 
* * * 
Secondly, it has been held that no change of 
circumstances occurs where investors anticipate 
business success only to be disappointed by actual 
results.20 There is an analogous proposition: neither 
an advance nor a decline in the market value of the 
securities purchased can constitute a valid 'change 
of circumstanoes.'21 
Thirdly, the substantiality of the required 
'change of circumstances' varies directly with the 
length of time between purchase and sale. The 
shorter the time, the more drastic the required 
change. Is there a minimum period, in all events? 
This is unclear, and 
... prudent counsel would prefer to see the 
20Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F. 2d 461, 468 (2d 
Cir., 1959) cert. den. 361 U.S. 896. 
21Crowell Collier Publishing Co., Securities Act Release 
No. 3825 (Aug. 12, 1957). 
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passage of at least two years as partial basis 
for his opinion that sale may be made because 
of a change of circumstances which was not 
contemplated at the time the security wa.s 
originally acquired."22 
In most of the reported cases, the changes in circum-
stances were considered to be an insufficient basis for the 
claim of exemption. (See Cohen, Federal Legislation Affect-
ing the Public Offering of Securities, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
119, 142, 1959). The change of circumstances theory is 
obviously somewhat elusive also. We submit, therefore, that 
Respondent's complaint fails to establish a statutory basis 
for an exemption under an alleged change of circumstances. 
Of more importance to the present determination, how-
ever, is the complete absence of any evidence in the record 
sustaining Respondent's claim of a change in circumstances, 
nor has Respondent asked for a hearing to present such 
evidence. The lower court was disposed to rule for Re-
spondent as a matter of law, but certainly such ruling was 
premature and improper without any evidence in the record 
against which Respondent's claims could be tested. 
Respondent has not exhausted all other pos-
sible remedies in that there is no evidence he has made any 
request to the SEC for a "no-action" letter which would 
protect Respondent and Appellant from any injunctive or 
similar action being instituted by the Commission, if the 
requested transfer is made. Such a letter might be obtained 
22When Corporations Go Public, 20, (Israels and Duff, 
Jr., eds., 1962). 
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from the Commission upon a proper showing of change in 
Respondent's circumstances. (The Wheat Report, p. 156.) 
POINT III 
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM SELLING 
THE SUBJECT STOCK IN APPELLANT CORPORA-
TION BECAUSE OF HIS OWNERSHIP OF OTHER 
INVESTMENT STOCK AND THE APPLICATION 
OF THE SEC'S "FUNGIBILITY" NOTION 
The record evidences that Respondent's 10,000 shares 
of Homestead Minerals Corporation Common Stock was 
acquired prior to April 16, 1968, as part of an issue under 
contract effective February 29, 1968. (R. 25, 26) Subse-
quently, and on July 9, 1968, Respondent obtained. an addi-
tional 1,111 shares of investment stock bearing the legend: 
"Investment stock not subject 1;o transfer until 
registered under the Securities Act of 1933 or a 
prior opinion of counsel, satisfactory to the issuer, 
that registration is not required under the Act." 
Respondent's acquisition of such st.ock under the more 
rigorous investment representation falls squarely within the 
rule that all st.ock is deemed to be held for investment if 
part of it is held under investment restrictions, irrespective 
of the manner and time of purchase of any of the st.ock. 
The SEC counsel and staff have promulgated and are 
enforcing a theory to the effect that if a person holds invest-
ment stock from a corporation, all stock of the same issuer 
held by him, whether obtained in the market or otherwise, 
is "tainted" by the investment intent. He is thus prohibited 
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from selling any of his stock of that corporation until it is 
registered or otherwise made exempt from registration. 
Sometimes called the "fungibility notion," the theory has not 
yet been enshrined in any statute, regulation, or judicial 
decision. It is effectively described in a very interesting 
article: Kennedy-"The Case of the Scarlet Letter or the 
Easy Way Out 'Private Offering'" The Business Lawyer, 
Vol. 23, No. 1, November, 1967. 
More authoritatively, the Wheat Report states: 
"(d) The peculiar effects of the 'fungibility 
concept.' 
If there is to be an 'investment intent' test for 
exemption under the '33 Act, the fungibility of secu-
rities purchased at different times is essential to i1;s 
integrity. An example will illustrate the concept: 
A purchases 10,000 shares of the common 
stock of a particular issuer in the trading mar-
ket. One year later he acquires 10,000 additional 
shares directly from the same issuer in a non-
public transaction. Ten days after the latter 
transaction, without having experienced any 
'change of circumstances,' A seeks a 'no-action' 
letter from the Commission's staff regarding 
the proposed sale to the public of the 10,000 
shares he purchased in the trading market. The 
'no-action' request would be denied. All of the 
shares now held by A would be deemed to be 
restricted against public sale." 
* * * 
" 'Fungibility' also applies, of course, when suc-
cessive blocks of the same security are purchased in 
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a series of private offerings. A special application 
of the fungibility doctrine relates to so-called 'con-
tingent stock' issued in acquisitions. Assume that 
company A acquires company B from its 7 share-
holders, agreeing to issue 50,000 shares of A's com-
mon stock in exchange for the stock of B, and also 
agreeing that if B's business maintains or achieves 
certain levels of profitability (and not otherwise) 
the 7 shareholders of B will be entitled, five years 
later, to an additional 25,000 shares of A. C, one of 
the 7 shareholders of B, receives 2,000 shares as his 
portion of the 'contingent' block of 25,000 shares. 
A month later he decides to sell a portion of the 
shares acquired by him five years previously. The 
Commission's staff, in denying no action requests 
under similar circumstances, takes the position that 
the receipt of the 'contingent' shares starts a new 
holding period as to all shares of the same class then 
held by C. 
In application, the present 'fungibility concept' 
bears little relationship to the needs of investors for 
disclosure. It has never been formalized as a Com-
mission rule or interpretative release, and hence 
introduces an additional element of uncertainty into 
an already clouded situation. It is essential, however, 
to prevent evasion of registration requirements under 
present interpretations of the exemptive provisions." 
Because of that position of the SEC, Respondent may 
not dispose of any securities of Appellant held by him until 
he has satisfactorily established that all securities acquired 
by him from Appellant for investment are no longer under 
any restriction upon their further transfer. 
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CONCLUSION 
By reason of the foregoing, it must be concluded: 
(a) Respondent's holding period of investment stock 
does not fulfill even the two year minimum spoken of by 
the SEC authorities; 
(b) No change of circumstances has been shown in 
fulfillment of another of the SEC's requirements; 
(c) Respondent's more recently acquired investment 
stock with more restrictive investment representations re-
quires all of his stock to be so held until registration. 
Accordingly, Appellant requests this Court to reverse 
the lower court's final order and judgment, with consequent 
dismissal of the action. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
.. 
DON B. ALLEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
